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On 30 November 2009, a standing committee of the Dutch Parliament had an 
interesting discussion with the government on the ‘Temporary Act on Media 
Concentrations’, which is in force since 2007.1 The act contains specific rules, 
complementary to general competition law, for the markets in radio, 
television and newspapers. The act would expire on 1 January 2010, but this 
date could be postponed by royal decree. The key question was whether a 
postponement was desirable. Constitutionally, a royal decree is made by the 
government alone. However, it is customary for the government to consult 
parliament on sensitive matters. In the Dutch political system, governments 
are based on a majority in parliament (in 2009: Christian-democrats, Labour 
and the small Christian Union). It is important to keep all partners of the 
coalition happy. If one of them loses confidence in the government, the 
ministers are under a duty to resign. 
The chance that the debate of 30 November 2009 would cause such a 
crisis was very small.2 Compared to other political issues of that time − the 
war in Afghanistan, the budget deficit and the future of retirement pensions 
– the Temporary Act on Media Concentrations was a minor subject. 
Nevertheless, the debate showed fundamental differences of opinion, even 
within the governing coalition. Speaking on behalf of the government, 
Minister Ronald Plasterk (Labour) said that he wanted to extend the 
temporary act with an additional two years. In his view, a specific legal 
instrument was needed to prevent a situation where one company has too 
much power over public opinion. General competition law would not suffice. 
A majority of parliament disagreed. The liberal opposition alleged that the 
Temporary Act on Media Concentrations had been an unnecessary hindrance 
for innovation. At least, the limitations on media concentrations should be 
diminished. The Liberal Party introduced a motion to that effect, which was 
 
1 Act of Parliament of 16 May 2007, Staatsblad 2007, 204. 




adopted on 8 December 2009.3 The Christian Democrats voted with the 
opposition. A few days later, the government decided to prolong the act 
anyway.4 
This short introduction illustrates that the role of the State towards 
concentration in the media is a topic of present interest in the Netherlands. In 
the next paragraphs we shall discuss how plurality is promoted by media 
law on the one hand and competition law on the other. It is important to note 
beforehand that the Netherlands have a strong public broadcasting sector, 
which is now extending its scope to new audiovisual services, in particular 
services on demand. Private undertakings complain that State aid for these 
services is distorting competition. The objections against anti-concentration 
measures should be seen in this context. European Union law plays a 
significant role here. Moreover, we shall see that restrictions on media 
ownership are not the only way of promoting pluralism. Finally, attention 
shall be paid to factual developments and prospects for the future. 
1. General Considerations 
1.1. Definitions 
In this report, the word ‘media’ is used in a narrow sense. We shall focus on 
radio, television and newspapers. It is generally thought that these media 
have the greatest impact on public opinion. Consequently, the Dutch Media 
Act only regulates audiovisual services and State aid for the printed press.5 
Booksellers, libraries and cinemas are not affected. A more difficult question 
is what the words ‘radio’ and ‘television’ mean. Are they restricted to classic 
broadcasting services, meant for simultaneous viewing by the public on the 
basis of a programme schedule? The EU Directive on Audiovisual Media 
Services (AMS-Directive) obliges EU Member States, such as the 
Netherlands, to set rules for ‘linear’ as well as ‘non-linear’ television.6 The 
Media Act, therefore, contains several provisions regarding non-linear 
services. However, unlike the AMS-Directive, the Media Act does not use the 
word ‘programme’ for video on demand. It sounds like a technical detail, but 
there are important consequences for the scope of the Temporary Act on 
Media Concentrations. This Act concerns the markets for radio programmes, 
television programmes and newspapers. Due to the definition of 
‘programme’ in the Media Act, the market for internet services falls outside 
 
3 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32123 VIII, No. 74. 
4 Royal Decree of 21 December 2009, Staatsblad 2009, 603. 
5 Act of Parliament of 29 December 2008, Staatsblad 2008, 583. The Act has been 
amended by Acts of Parliament of 2 July 2009, Staatsblad 2009, 300 and 10 December 
2009, Staatsblad 2009, 552, respectively. 
6 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2007, amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 2007, L 332/27. 
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the scope of the Act. Nevertheless, we shall pay attention to non linear 
services also. 
1.2. History 
Newspapers in the Netherlands have a history that is very different from 
radio and television. The first newspapers appeared in the 17th century, in the 
time of the Dutch Republic.7 In the absence of a king and a central 
bureaucracy, private entrepreneurs enjoyed more liberty than elsewhere in 
Europe. Famous were the papers written in French, providing news about 
current affairs abroad. As they were read by an international audience, one 
could compare the Dutch newspapers between 1618 and 1795 with the 
Luxemburg-based broadcasting stations between 1931 and now. Capital and 
creativity often came from outside, in particular from French refugees. A 
reluctance to intervene has been characteristic for the regulation of 
newspapers ever since. ‘The best press law is no press law’, one used to say. 
Around 1970, however, there was a growing concern that many newspapers 
would not survive the competition with television. After several titles had 
gone down, the government introduced limited financial support for 
newspapers. In order to prevent political interference in editorial matters, the 
power to subsidize was attributed to an independent authority. Introducing a 
specific merger regime took more time. It was only in 2007 that the 
Temporary Act on Media Concentrations was adopted. 
Radio and television have always been under more government control. 
The first radio broadcasts were transmitted as early as 1919, television 
broadcasts followed in 1951. Government interference was considered as 
normal, because frequencies were scarce and radio and television were 
suspected of threatening public morals. However, there was a difference with 
other countries. In the Netherlands, a national monopolist has never been 
established. Public broadcasting has always been an activity for private 
associations, each representing a religious or political current in society. 
Although advertising was strictly prohibited, the associations cherished their 
autonomy. The word ‘public broadcasting’ was not known before 1991, when 
commercial radio and television were introduced. From that moment the 
associations became ready to cooperate and stress their common remit. 
Minding the public remit is no luxury, because the European Commission 
carefully watches that funding broadcasting services is not distorting the 
market.8 
As a consequence, the present Media Act reflects two opposing 
philosophies. On the one hand, there is a public media service. It must 
provide high quality programmes, in traditional broadcasting as well as new 
 
7 Schneider & Hemels 1979 and Baschwitz 1949. 
8 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public 
service broadcasting, published 27 October 2009, OJ 2009, C 257, p. 1-14. 
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electronic services. For historic reasons, private organizations still play an 
important role. Three television networks and seven national radio networks 
have been allocated to the public media service. The participants are licensed 
by the government, receive financial support and their activities are strictly 
regulated. For example, they may not enter the newspaper market. Private 
media are in a different situation. In relation to them, the philosophy is that 
free market principles should be respected. The Media Act implements the 
EU Directive on Audiovisual Media Services, but there is little other 
regulation as to private electronic media. Newspapers are regulated even 
less. A policy of non-intervention was felt to be justified, because a broad 
range of high quality programmes is already offered by the public media 
service. However, there are disputed territories. On the internet, for example, 
the public media service provides video channels, supported by public 
money. Private broadcasters and publishers see this as a distortion of 
competition.  
1.3. Freedom of Speech 
Article 7 of the Constitution deals with the fundamental right to freedom of 
speech. The provision makes a distinction between the printed press on the 
one hand and radio and television on the other. A licensing system is 
prohibited as far as books, newspapers and magazines are concerned. For 
radio and television a licensing system is allowed, unless it amounts to 
‘censorship’. In principle, Article 7 of the Constitution is negative right. It 
protects against government interference, even if such interference is based 
on the wish to protect consumers, culture or democracy. For example, in 1958 
the Government introduced a licensing system for book shops in order to 
protect high quality book shops against cherry-picking by supermarkets, 
tobacconists etc. The new regulation required a professional diploma for 
selling books to the public. In 1960, the Supreme Court decided that the 
regulation was an infringement of Article 7. The argument that plurality in 
the book market would benefit from a licensing system did not convince the 
Court. Similar judgments were made by the Supreme Court in relation to 
libraries and printing companies.9 
The primarily negative obligations, implied in Article 7, are a major 
obstacle for specific legislation against press concentrations. If no license may 
be required for publishing a newspaper, it would be strange to require a 
license for the merger of newspapers. The constitutional objections become 
evident when the criterion is to be how much harm will be done to the 
plurality of the press. Such a test cannot be performed without establishing 
how useful a particular newspaper is. This runs counter to the very essence 
 
9 Hoge Raad 22 March 1960, NJ 1960, 274 (Book sellers). See also Hoge Raad 22 
November 1960, NJ 1961, 206 (Libraries) and Hoge Raad 23 May 1961, NJ 1961, 427 
(Printing shops). 
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of Article 7 of the Constitution. The question which newspapers must survive 
and which may disappear should be decided by the market, not a licensing 
authority. A similar interpretation of Article 7 was given by the Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal – the highest court in competition matters − in 
2001. The national competition authority had allowed the transfer of a 
newspaper to another company only after a commitment that the newspaper 
would remain focused on a particular geographical area. This condition was 
considered illegitimate, because it refers to the content of the paper.10 
1.4. Positive Obligations 
The text of Article 7 of the Constitution says nothing about positive 
obligations for the State to protect plurality of the media. Nevertheless, it is 
commonly accepted that it is a general principle of law that the government 
should prevent excessive press concentrations. This principle was explicitly 
mentioned by the former European Commission of Human Rights in a case 
against the Netherlands in 1976.11 In 1993, the European Court of Human 
Rights considered in case about Article 10 ECHR: 
‘The Court has frequently stressed the fundamental role of freedom of 
expression in a democratic society, in particular where, through the press, it 
serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is 
moreover entitled to receive (see, for example, mutatis mutandis, the Observer 
and Guardian v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A 
no. 216, pp. 29-30). Such an undertaking cannot be successfully accomplished 
unless it is grounded in the principle of pluralism, of which the State is the 
ultimate guarantor. This observation is especially valid in relation to audio-
visual media, whose programmes are often broadcast very widely’. 
The principle of pluralism is also embedded in Article 11, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.12 
In the context of freedom of speech, the concept of ‘plurality’ primarily 
refers to information and ideas on matters of public interest. Citizens must be 
able to inform themselves from several sources with different political 
perspectives. This is an essential condition for democracy. However, there 
are also cultural and linguistic reasons why a government should respect, 
protect and promote plurality in the media.13 For example, Article 22 of the 
 
10 College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 5 December 2001, Wegener v. NMa, 
<www.rechtspraak.nl>, LJN: AD6693, Mediaforum 2002-4, No. 15, commented by F.J. 
Leeflang and K.J.M. Mortelmans. 
11 European Commission of Human Rights 6 July 1976, NJ 1978, 237, Geïllustreerde Pers 
v. The Netherlands. 
12 OJ 2007 C303/1. Article 11-2 reads: ‘The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be 
respected’. 
13 See Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity of media 




Dutch Constitution instructs the government to foster cultural development 
and innovation. Also relevant is the Convention on the protection and 
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, which was adopted by the 
General Conference of the Unesco in Paris on 20 October 2005.14 As for 
linguistic diversity mention should be made of the Framework Convention 
for the protection of national minorities, adopted by the Member States of the 
Council of Europe and others in Strasbourg on 1 February 1995.15 
It is important to keep in mind that the obligation to refrain from 
interference in freedom of speech is a hard rule, whereas the positive 
obligation to foster plurality of information is a legal principle. There is only 
one way in which a government can comply with the obligation not to 
interfere, that is: keeping their hands off. Legal principles can be fulfilled in 
several ways. A politician who strongly believes in the free market will 
choose other means than a supporter of the Welfare State. Consequently, 
judges will tread carefully. If the government violates freedom of speech by 
arbitrary interferences, a judge will not hesitate to declare this policy illegal. 
But he will find it more difficult to decide that a government should take 
measures to prevent media concentrations. Political discussions are better 
placed in parliament than in a court room. This does not mean that positive 
obligations can never be enforced. In particular, authorities may not sit still 
when people suffer from private wrongdoings. However, the legal principle 
that plurality must be protected cannot be used as an excuse for censorship. 
When confronted with media concentrations competition authorities must, 
therefore, be mindful of the limits set by Article 7 of the Dutch Constitution 
and Article 10 of the ECHR.  
2. Media Rules against Concentrations 
2.1. Temporary Act on Media Concentrations 
On 1 July 2007, the Temporary Act on Media Concentrations entered into 
force. The Act has the following characteristics: 
a. First, it has abolished former cross ownership limitations. Between 1991 
and 2007 there had been a law prohibiting private broadcasters from 
having a dominant position in the market for newspapers and prohibit-
ing newspapers with a dominant position from having substantial in-
fluence over a private broadcaster. ‘Dominance’ was defined as a 
market share of 25%. ‘Substantial influence’ was defined as having one 
 
14 The Convention was ratified by the Netherlands on 9 October 2009 and entered into 
force for the Netherlands on 9 January 2010. 
15 The Framework Convention was ratified by the Netherlands on 16 February 2005 and 
entered into force for the Netherlands on 1 June 2005. The Media Act has 
implemented the convention by providing for broadcasts in the Frisian language. 
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third of the votes in the shareholders meeting or control over one third 
of the Executive Board or Supervisory Board. This specific rule against 
multimedia activities was felt to be obsolete in 2007.  
b. Today, media concentrations are prohibited that presumably endanger 
plurality of opinion. In particular, a newspaper may not acquire a mar-
ket share over 35% in the user market for newspapers. Also, a media 
conglomerate may not acquire a market share over 90% in the com-
bined user markets (300%) for newspapers, radio and television. In both 
cases the prohibition is limited to mergers and acquisitions. If a com-
pany transgresses a maximum through market success or failure of its 
competitors, there is no violation.  
c. The market share of a newspaper is calculated on the basis of circula-
tion. Market shares for radio and television are determined by measur-
ing the listening time and the viewing time. The general competition 
authority, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa), must prevent 
media concentrations that violate the law. However, it is for the special-
ized media watchdog Commissariaat voor de Media (CvdM) to gather the 
necessary data and give advice to the NMa. 
d. Finally, the CvdM is charged with the task to monitor developments in 
the national and international media markets and their consequences 
for plurality and independence. The findings are to be published in a 
yearly report, called the ‘Media Monitor’. There is no need for the 
CvdM to limit its monitoring to newspapers, radio and television. It 
may also look at other media institutions, such as press agencies, search 
engines or social network services. 
Originally, the Temporary Act was meant to expire on 1 January 2010. 
However, Article 15 states that the government can appoint a later date. On 
21 December 2009 a royal decree was made in order to extend the validity of 
the Act. According to this decree, the Act will expire on 1 January 2012.  
The introduction of the Temporary Act in 2007 was a compromise. In 
the past, some parties had submitted that the absence of a specific merger 
control system for the press was a serious danger for plurality of opinion. In 
their view, the government should take active measures against the 
continuing press concentrations. The disappearance of traditional 
newspapers with a diversity of political opinions worried them. Competition 
law was not enough to counter this development, so they said. Their plea 
was that press mergers should be forbidden, unless the companies could 
show that the existing plurality of opinion was guaranteed. Others objected 
that such a law would be ineffective and unconstitutional. Ineffective, 
because legislation cannot save independent newspapers when economic 
circumstances are bad. Sometimes a merger is the only way to keep at least 
one newspaper alive. Secondly, a specific law against press mergers would 
A.W. HINS 
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be against Article 7 of the Constitution, that prohibits prior control over the 
printed press.16 
Choosing a middle course, the Temporary Act tries to accommodate 
both sides. On the one hand, specific rules have been set for media markets in 
order to protect plurality of opinion. On the other, the Temporary Act is only 
an addition to the Competition Act. Under this Act the Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) supervises markets in general. In principle, the 
NMa does not judge the quality of products, because that is for the 
consumers to decide. What the Temporary Act does, is specifying the 
maximum market shares that are acceptable for media concentrations. 
Exceptions cannot be allowed. However, the media watchdog Commissariaat 
voor de Media (CvdM) plays a role too. First, the NMa must ask its advise 
when a media concentration has been notified. Second, the CvdM can 
express its long term views in the yearly Media Monitor. The final decisions 
about media concentrations, however, are taken by the NMa. 
2.2. Scope of the Temporary Act 
The scope of the Temporary Act is limited to newspapers, radio and 
television. The definition of ‘newspapers’ includes free papers that are 
distributed on weekdays in railway stations, supermarkets etc. Article 1 of 
the Temporary Act states that a newspaper must be printed on paper and 
appear at least five days a week. There is no obligation that the consumer 
must pay. In this respect, there is a difference with the press subsidy rules 
under the Media Act 2008. Subsidies can be granted by an independent 
authority, the Stimuleringsfonds voor de Pers, to newspapers and magazines 
that appear at least once a month. Under Article 8.10 of the Media Act, one of 
the conditions is that the periodical is not free of charge. Readers must either 
take a subscription or buy single issues. Responding to written questions of 
Parliament, the government explained in 2007 why it was necessary to take 
account of free newspapers when calculating market shares. For a significant 
part of the population, so the government said, free papers have the same 
function as traditional newspapers.17 As a consequence, the total user market 
is defined in a broad way and the ceiling of 35% will not be reached easily. 
There is a second difference between the subsidy rules of the Media Act 
and the anti-concentration rules of the Temporary Act. Under the Media Act, 
subsidies can only be granted to periodicals ‘providing a substantial amount 
of news, analysis, comments and background information about current 
events in society, thus contributing to political opinion building’.18 It is not 
necessary to deal with all categories of ‘news’, but a periodical must at least 
discuss a diverse segment of contemporary society. A hobby magazine or a 
 
16 Nieuwenhuis 1991. 
17 Aanhangsel II 2006/07, No. 1745. 
18 Art. 8.10, para. 2 sub b, of the Media Act 2008. 
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periodical that only aims at amusement does not qualify for press subsidies. 
The Temporary Act, on the other hand, makes no reference to the content of 
newspapers. If a paper appears at least five days a week, it automatically 
belongs to the user market for newspapers. The drafters of the Act aimed at 
transparency and simplicity. Making a distinction between papers that 
contribute to political opinion and papers that do not, would have demanded 
a more complicated administration. Furthermore, the Temporary Act makes 
no distinction between national and local markets. 
In paragraph I, we have seen that the concepts of ‘radio’ and ‘television’ 
have a restricted meaning in the Temporary Act. The words do not include 
non linear services, such as video on demand. In the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the bill of 2006, the government admitted that internet has 
become an important tool for gathering information on matters of public 
interest, but it decided not to regulate internet services. Two reasons were 
submitted for this. First, the government held that it is practically impossible 
to ascertain which websites on the world wide web have a considerable 
influence on public opinion in the Netherlands and should, therefore, be 
counted as relevant market players. Second, the internet by itself prevents 
that a limited number of participants will determine the news and the public 
debate. One possible problem was touched upon briefly, namely the power 
of search engines. Indeed, there is a risk that the operator of a search engine 
can restrict access to sources of information for reasons that are not in the 
public interest. However, the government concluded that the Temporary Act 
on Media Concentrations was not the right instrument to regulate search 
engines.19 
Radio and television programmes are supplied by public and private 
media. It must be remembered that public broadcasting in the Netherlands is 
provided for by private associations, but there is a clear difference with 
private broadcasting. The associations have privileges, such as state funding, 
must carry rights and access to radio frequencies, but these privileges 
correspond with the obligation to provide high-quality programmes and 
programmes for minority groups. Private broadcasters neither have the 
privileges, nor the obligations. They can make a profit with simple 
programmes that generate a lot of advertising revenue. In calculating market 
shares under the Temporary Act, both categories of broadcasting are 
counted. As there is no maximum market share for television and radio, the 
viewing and listening time spent on public programmes is only relevant for 
the rule that no conglomerate should acquire a market share of more than 
90% of the combined markets for radio, television and newspapers (300%). 
Public broadcasters can reach this maximum only in theory, because the 
Media Act prohibits them from publishing a newspaper. It is fair to say that a 
strong public broadcasting system makes it easier for a newspaper company 
 
19 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30921, No. 3, p. 3. 
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to acquire private radio and television stations without exceeding the 
maximum of 90% market share.20 
2.3. Implementation of the Temporary Act 
The Temporary Act on Media Concentrations is an addition to the 
Competition Act. Later, we shall discuss the Competition Act in more detail. 
Now, it suffices that all concentrations of importance must be notified with 
the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa). Under Article 34 of the 
Competition Act it is forbidden to establish a concentration without prior 
notification and before four weeks have elapsed. Article 3 of the Temporary 
Act states that the NMa must decide within four weeks whether or not the 
concentration will lead to market shares prohibited by this Act. The decision 
can be challenged before the Court of Rotterdam, which is specialized in 
competition matters.21 Appeal is possible with the College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven (Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal), whose judgment is 
final.22 Finally, Articles 5 and 6 of the Temporary Act deal with inspections 
and sanctions. These articles refer to the Competition Act, which means that 
the NMa can impose fines up to € 450,000 or – if this is more – 10% of the 
turnover of the previous year. The NMa can also take coercive measures. 
3. Media Rules Promoting Plurality of Information 
3.1. Public Service Media 
A principle aim of the Media Act 2008 is promoting plurality of information. 
In this respect, there is little difference with its predecessors. The 
establishment of a public media service is a central element in the Act. Before 
2008, the focus was on public broadcasting. Today, the public service remit 
has been expanded to interactive electronic media. This is in line with a 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
encouraging member states ‘to guarantee the fundamental role of the public 
service media in the new digital environment’. According to this 
Recommendation, public service media should offer: 
 
20 The market shares of public broadcasting in 2008 were about 35% for television and 
about 30% for radio. See <www.mediamonitor.nl>. 
21 Art. 7 Temporary Act in connection with Art. 93 Competition Act. The Explanatory 
Memorandum suggests that it is not necessary to file an administrative appeal with 
the NMa first (Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30921, No. 3, p. 13). The government 
probably thought that a decision based on Art. 3 Temporary Act is comparable to a 
licensing decision based on Art. 44 of the Competition Act and that, therefore, Art. 93, 
subsection 2, Competition Act is applicable. However, the law itself is not clear on 
this. 
22 Art. 20 of the Wet bestuursrechtspraak bedrijfsorganisatie (Act on administrative 
jurisdiction in regulated markets) in connection with the Annex to this Act. 
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‘a) a reference point for all members of the public, offering universal access;  
b) a factor for social cohesion and integration of all individuals, groups and 
communities;  
c) a source of impartial and independent information and comment, and of 
innovatory and varied content which complies with high ethical and quality 
standards; 
d) a forum for pluralistic public discussion and a means of promoting broader 
democratic participation of individuals; 
e) an active contributor to audiovisual creation and production and greater 
appreciation and dissemination of the diversity of national and European 
cultural heritage’.23 
As to point d, the Recommendation specifies: 
‘14. Public service media should play an important role in promoting broader 
democratic debate and participation, with the assistance, among other things, 
of new interactive technologies, offering the public greater involvement in the 
democratic process. Public service media should fulfil a vital role in educating 
active and responsible citizens, providing not only quality content but also a 
forum for public debate, open to diverse ideas and convictions in society, and a 
platform for disseminating democratic values.  
15. Public service media should provide adequate information about the 
democratic system and democratic procedures, and should encourage 
participation not only in elections but also in decision-making processes and 
public life in general. Accordingly, one of the public service media’s roles 
should be to foster citizens’ interest in public affairs and encourage them to 
play a more active part.  
16. Public service media should also actively promote a culture of tolerance 
and mutual understanding by using new digital and online technologies.  
17. Public service media should play a leading role in public scrutiny of 
national governments and international governmental organizations, 
enhancing their transparency, accountability to the public and legitimacy, 
helping eliminate any democratic deficit, and contributing to the development 
of a European public sphere.  
18. Public service media should enhance their dialogue with, and 
accountability to, the general public, also with the help of new interactive 
services’. 
As mentioned before, the public media service in the Netherlands is 
provided for by private media associations. They are coordinated by a body 
called Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO), which means Netherlands Public 
Broadcasting. The name is a bit old-fashioned, since the public service remit 
is not limited to broadcasting anymore. The reason for not changing the 
name is that it has become a strong trademark. In the last fifteen years, the 
powers of NPO have grown. For example, NPO distributes government 
funds among the associations and makes the programme schedules for 
public radio and television. Furthermore, NPO represents the common 
 
23 Recommendation Rec(2007)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
remit of public service media in the information society, adopted on 31 January 2007. 
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interests of the associations. Acting on behalf of them, NPO concludes 
collective contracts with trade unions, copyright organizations, foreign 
broadcasters etc. Nevertheless, the associations have editorial responsibility. 
Under the Media Act they are entitled to certain amounts of time on the 
national networks. Each association has its own political, religious or cultural 
identity. Therefore, plurality of ideas in the public media service is mainly 
guaranteed by them. 
Media associations obtain a licence from the government for a period of 
five years. In order to get a full status, 150,000 members are necessary. 
Members must be over 16 years, live in the Netherlands and pay a minimum 
subscription fee.24 New organizations only need 50,000 members for a 
preliminary status.25 They get a limited amount of transmitting time, which 
enables them to present themselves and appeal to a broader audience. If they 
succeed in attracting 150,000 members before the next cycle of five years 
begins, they can stay. If not, they are out. It is not possible to obtain a 
preliminary status for a second time. Established media organizations that 
have dropped below the 150,000 mark, must leave too. The amount of 
transmitting time for an association depends on the number of its members. 
Today, there are only two categories: those under 300,000 members and those 
above 300,000 members. This situation will change, starting from 1 
September 2010. From then, each extra member above 150,000 will lead to 
extra broadcasting time until a maximum of 400,000 members.26 
Interestingly, the Media Act tries to promote plurality of opinion by 
stating that a newcomer must not merely duplicate what other associations 
are doing. A candidate applying for a preliminary status must promise that 
its programmes will significantly differ from existing programmes, in view of 
their ‘tendency, content or target groups’.27 The combination of quantitative 
and qualitative criteria tries to respond to changing preferences of the public. 
In September 2010, two new associations will enter with a preliminary status. 
They find themselves on the right side of the political spectre. A left-wing 
ecologist association that had a preliminary status between 2005 and 2010 
must stop, because the government decided its programmes had resembled 
the others too much. Roughly speaking, the public media system as a whole 
will get a more conservative appearance from 2010. This might be a reaction 
to accusations that the programmes have been too ‘leftish’. Finally, the Media 
Act makes allowance for minorities that are not represented by a media 
association. One might think of immigrants, who cannot find their way into 
the complicated system. For such groups, the Media Act has created an 
organization without members, the Nederlandse Programma Stichting (NPS). 
 
24 Art. 2.25 and 2.27 Media Act. 
25 Art. 2.26 and 2.27 Media Act. 
26 Art. I sub HH of the Act of 2 July 2009, Staatblad 2009, 300, in connection with the 
Royal Decree of 3 December 2009, Staatsblad 2009, 528. 
27 Art. 2.26, sub d, of the Media Act.  
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Its task is to provide programmes that are complementary to those of the 
associations. 
3.2. Other Ways of Guaranteeing Plurality 
As to private media, the Media Act has only a few provisions aiming at 
plurality of information. One example is the obligation for media companies 
to establish a covenant with their employees, defining what the organization 
stands for. The obligation is created by Article 3.5 and 3.29d of the Media Act 
in relation to private broadcasting companies and providers of video on 
demand, respectively. As to newspapers and magazines, Article 8.10 of the 
Media Act contains a similar requirement if they receive a subsidy from the 
Stimuleringsfonds voor de Pers. This Article explicitly states that the editorial 
staff must work ‘independently’ of the owners. However, one should not 
overestimate the practical usefulness of these obligations. If employees 
content themselves with a very vague covenant, there is little public 
authorities can do. Moreover, a covenant offers no protection against 
economically hard times. If an employer can show that the only way to 
survive is to deviate from ideological principles, many journalists will 
conclude that keeping their jobs takes priority. 
Other provisions focus on the technical infrastructure, such as terrestrial 
transmitters or cable networks. Before allocating radio frequencies to private 
broadcasters, the government can decide what kind of programmes must be 
transmitted over these frequencies. For example, some frequencies will be 
earmarked for news and current events, others for classical music or jazz. In 
the following auction or beauty contest, candidates can choose which 
category fits them best. The result is a mixed ‘bouquet’ of programming 
formats. However, the government has no authority to determine the 
political colour of the stations. Next, Article 6.24 of the Media Act states that 
private radio broadcasters cannot use more than one FM frequency network. 
A Royal Decree, implementing this Article, specifies when two related 
companies must be treated as if they were one. The definition closely 
resembles the definition of a ‘concentration’ in the Competition Act. 
Furthermore, the Royal Decree allows the minister of Cultural Affairs to 
make exceptions.  
As far as cable networks are concerned, the Media Act contains a few 
must carry obligations. They will apply as long as cable is the most important 
instrument for receiving programming material by a significant part of the 
population in the Netherlands.28 Public service programmes must be carried, 
because they are paid for by the taxpayers. Due to a treaty with Belgium, the 
same is true for Belgian public service programmes in Dutch (with a 
maximum of two radio and two television networks). Apart from that, local 
governments must establish programming councils. Such a council must give 
 
28 Art. 6.12 Media Act. 
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guidelines to the local cable operator on the programming of 15 television 
channels and 25 radio channels. If the guidelines are unreasonable, the cable 
operator may ignore them. However, the Commissariaat voor de Media can 
impose a fine if a guideline is ignored without good reason. The 
programming council is supposed to represent the interests of the consumers 
and their activities should aim at ‘pluralism’ in the selected programmes 
(Art. 6.21 of the Media Act). The latter obligation is rather toothless. In 
general, there is little enthusiasm about the role of programming councils. 
Recently, the minister of Cultural Affairs wrote to parliament that the 
European Commission is not happy either. A bill amending the Media Act is 
expected soon.29  
4. Competition Law 
4.1. The Competition Act 
The Competition Act 1997 entered into force on 1 January 1998. It regulates 
anti-competitive behaviour as well as merger control. The Act is strongly 
inspired by competition law of the European Union and uses familiar 
concepts. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the government stated that the 
provisions must be interpreted in the light of EU practice and EU case law.30 
If necessary, a national court can request a preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice. The fact that a case is governed by national law 
only does not preclude the procedure of Article 267 TFEU. This is shown by 
the landmark judgment Leur-Bloem. Dealing with Article 177 EC, a 
predecessor of Article 267 TFEU, the ECJ held: 
‘The Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 177 of the EC Treaty to 
interpret Community law where the situation in question is not governed 
directly by Community law but the national legislature, in transposing the 
provisions of a directive into domestic law, has chosen to apply the same 
treatment to purely internal situations and to those governed by the directive, 
so that it has aligned its domestic legislation to Community law’.31 
Before 1998, there was a much softer law on competition. In fact, there was 
no national merger control. Only the European Commission had powers 
under the EC Merger Regulation, regarding very large concentrations.32 
However, the government could use the exception of Article 22 of the 
Regulation. Under this provision, a Member State may request the 
 
29 Letter of 15 October 2009; Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32123 VIII, No. 14. 
30 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24707, No. 3, p. 10. 
31 ECJ 17 July 1997, C-28/95, Leur-Bloem. 
32 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, OJ 2004, L 24, p. 1-22. The 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol decision was taken under its predecessor: Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ 1989, L 395, p. 1-12. 
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Commission to examine a concentration although it has no ‘Community 
dimension’. This was the background of the famous case 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol in 1995. The three parties – two broadcasters and a 
production company – had created a joint company, ‘Holland Media Groep’, 
that would supply radio and television programmes to the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Because the Competition Act was not yet in force, the national 
authorities could not examine the concentration themselves. So, the 
government went to the European Commission for help. The Commission 
concluded that the concentration would lead to the creation of a dominant 
position on the Dutch market for television advertising and to the 
strengthening of an already existing dominant position of Endemol in the 
market for independent television production.33 
The Competition Act introduced a national merger control. Executive 
powers are entrusted to the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa). In the 
beginning, this authority was a government agency for which the minister of 
Economic Affairs was fully responsible. Parliament hesitated to create an 
independent body, for as long as a minister is responsible, parliament has 
more influence. Seven years later, the situation changed. A bill amending the 
Competition Act was adopted in 2004 and entered into force on 1 July 2005.34 
It has given the NMa more independency. However, some political control 
still exists. For example, the minister of Economic Affairs can give 
‘guidelines’ to the NMa (Article 5d of the Competition Act). If the board of 
the NMa seriously fails in its duties, the minister can take all ‘necessary 
measures’ (Article 5f). Finally, the minister can allow a concentration, for 
reasons of public interest, against a prior decision of the NMa (Article 47). 
However, Article 47 is not applicable in cases regulated under the Temporary 
Act on Media Concentrations. 
4.2. Competition and the Media 
The tasks of the NMa can be summarized as follows: 
- promoting and safeguarding free competition; 
- taking action against parties that participate in cartels, for example, by 
fixing prices; 
- taking action against parties that abuse a dominant position; 
- reviewing mergers and acquisitions; 
- regulating the energy markets and transport markets in detail. 
 
33 Commission Decision 96/346/EC of 20 September 1995, OJ 1996, L 134, p. 32-52, 
followed by Commission Decision 96/649/EC of 17 July 1996, OJ 1996, L 294, p. 14-
17. 
34 Act of 9 December 2004, Staatsblad 2005, No. 172. 
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Radio, television, the press and internet are not excluded from its 
competences. Indeed, the NMa has taken several decisions concerning media 
markets. It has examined the refusal to sell programming data, access to 
cable networks, advertising facilities, television rights of football matches, 
concentrations of cable operators, newspapers etc. Details can be found on 
the website of the NMa, which is also available in English.35  
Sometimes, the general competences of the NMa overlap with specific 
competences of other regulatory bodies. If the provider of a public 
communications network arbitrarily refuses its services to a programming 
company, the independent telecommunications authority OPTA can 
intervene.36 More often than not, OPTA will have to interpret concepts which 
have their origin in competition law. Article 18.3 of the Telecommunications 
Act guarantees that OPTA and NMa operate in a coordinated way. A 
covenant between the two authorities lays down the procedures. A 
comparable situation exists between the Commissariaat voor de Media and the 
NMa. Under the Media Act, the CvdM can authorize non-broadcasting 
activities of public broadcasters only on condition that these activities do not 
violate the principle of market-conformity.37 In cases of doubt, the CvdM 
consults the NMa in order to avoid diverging interpretations of competition 
law. However, under the Temporary Act on Media Concentrations this risk 
does not exist. It is the NMa that decides on a planned media concentration. 
The CvdM only tenders an advice. Again, the procedural details are laid 
down in a covenant.38 
4.3. Merger Control 
Under Chapter 5 of the Competition Act, the NMa has prior control over 
concentrations. The term involves mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. 
The definition in Article 27 states: 
1. The term ‘concentration’ shall be understood to mean: 
a. the merger of two or more previously mutually independent 
undertakings; 
b. the acquisition of direct or indirect control by 
i. one or more natural persons who, or legal entities which, already 
control at least one undertaking, 
ii. one or more undertakings of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings, through the acquisition of a participating interest in the 
capital or assets, pursuant to an agreement, or by any other means. 
 
35 See the website <www.nmanet.nl>. 
36 OPTA means ‘Onafhankelijke Post- en Telecommunicatieautoriteit’. The relevant 
provisions are Arts. 6a.6 and 8.7 of the Telecommunications Act. 
37 Art. 2.132 Media Act. 
38 Staatscourant 24 June 2008, No. 119, p. 35. 
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2. The creation of a joint undertaking, which performs all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis shall qualify as a 
concentration as meant in subsection (1)(b). 
Only large concentrations are concerned.39 A ‘large’ concentration exists if the 
following conditions are met: 
1. the joint annual turnover of the undertakings worldwide amounts to 
more than € 113,450,000 and 
2. at least two of them have an annual turnover in the Netherlands of at 
least € 30 million each. 
The procedure of prior control by the NMa consists of two phases: the 
notification phase and the licensing phase. Undertakings that wish to bring 
about a large concentration, must first notify the NMa of their intention to do 
so.40 The NMa investigates whether there is reason to believe that 
competition on the Dutch market will be significantly restrained, in 
particular because the concentration will result in the emergence or 
strengthening of a dominant position. Within four weeks of receiving the 
notification, the NMa will inform the applicant whether or not a licence is 
required. If this term lapses without a decision, a licence is not required. 
During the period in which the notification is assessed, it is prohibited to 
bring about the concentration.  
If the NMa has decided so, the parties have to apply for a licence next.41 
The NMa investigates whether the proposed concentration will indeed result 
in a significant obstruction of competition. In order to reach a decision, NMa 
defines the relevant market and determines the market shares of the 
undertakings involved in the concentration and the market shares of 
competitors. It also investigates, for instance, what opportunities are 
available to third parties to enter the market and the extent to which buyers 
and suppliers will be dependent on the new company that is to be created. A 
decision on the application for a licence must be taken within 13 weeks. 
During the period in which the application is assessed, the concentration is 
prohibited. If the period of 13 weeks lapses, without a decision having been 
taken, the licence is deemed to have been granted.  
4.4. Remedies 
A licence may be issued subject to limitations and instructions.42 Since 2007, 
the NMa can do the same when it decides that no license is required for a 
 
39 Art. 29 Competition Act. 
40 Arts. 34-40 Competition Act. 
41 Arts. 41-49 Competition Act. 
42 Art. 41, subsection 4, Competition Act. 
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particular concentration.43 These measures, also known as ‘remedies’, aim at 
removing the potential harm a concentration can cause to competition. 
Guidelines of the NMa explain its policy.44 As a rule, limitations and 
instructions are imposed only after they have been offered by the parties 
themselves. The guidelines enable parties to foresee which commitments the 
NMa will find satisfactory.  
In principle, there are two sorts of remedies: structural and behavioural 
ones. Structural remedies require a structural change, for example the selling 
of a part of a company or the withdrawal from a joint venture. A behavioural 
remedy obliges an undertaking to behave in a certain way in the future. The 
NMa prefers structural remedies, because behavioural obligations need 
permanent supervision. This is an administrative burden in the long run. 
Moreover, the latter obligations can leave room for different interpretations 
and, therefore, lead to a series of conflicts. Nevertheless, sometimes the NMa 
chooses for a behavioural remedy. For example, when a party acquires 
essential facilities through a vertical concentration, the NMa can impose an 
obligation to give equal access to competitors. 
Failure to notify a contemplated merger, like other violations of the 
Competition Act, can be punished by the NMa. It can impose heavy fines in 
combination with coercive measures. The affected party has the right of 
administrative appeal to the NMa. If this appeal does not succeed, it is 
possible to file a judicial appeal with the Court of Rotterdam. Further appeal 
is possible to the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (the Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal) in The Hague. Decisions relating to a license – for 
example the decision that a license is needed − are different. Here, the 
interested parties can go to the Rotterdam Court directly without having 
tried an administrative appeal first.45 
5. Relations between Media and Competition Law 
5.1. Two Merger Regimes 
The media-specific rules, embedded in the Temporary Act on Media 
Concentrations, and the general rules of the Competition Act are 
implemented concurrently. As we have seen in Section 2.1, the Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) is competent under both laws. Parties, which 
are contemplating a large media concentration, have to notify their intention 
to the NMa by virtue of the Competition Act.46 The NMa must check first 
whether or not the concentration will lead to a market share above the 
 
43 Art. 37, subsection 4, Competition Act. 
44 Richtsnoeren Remedies 2007, adopted by the board of the NMa on 21 September 2007 
and published on the website <www.nmanet.nl>. 
45 Art. 93, subsection 2, Competition Act. 
46 Art. 34 Competition Act. 
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maxima specified in Article 2 of the Temporary Act (i.e. 35% market share in 
the user market for newspapers and 90% market share in the combined user 
markets for newspapers, radio and television).47 The aim is that there will be 
at least three independent newspaper companies. For radio and television 
such a guarantee was felt to be superfluous on account of the public 
broadcasting system. The government explained that it is very unlikely that 
mergers and acquisitions will bring about a situation where only one private 
broadcaster remains. Such a development can be prevented by the NMa with 
its normal powers.48 
Under the Competition Act, a merger control consists of two phases. 
First, the notification procedure. Second, when necessary, a licensing 
procedure. The Temporary Act on Media Concentrations creates a different 
system. Article 3 states that within four weeks of the notification, the NMa 
must decide about the market shares. The only question is whether or not the 
concentration transgresses the maxima, specified in Article 2. The answer is a 
simple yes or no. The NMa can make no exceptions, nor can it subject a 
positive decision to limitations and instructions. Finally, it should be 
remembered that Article 47 of the Competition Act is not applicable.49 Under 
this provision, the minister of Economic Affairs can allow a concentration, for 
reasons of public interest, setting aside a prior decision of the NMa. Article 2 
of the Temporary Act explicitly deviates from this. Therefore, the procedure 
is quick and simple. If there is a transgression, the concentration may not 
take place. In the unlikely event that parties would carry out the 
concentration anyway, they can be punished by the NMa. After a negative 
decision the only remedy is a judicial appeal. 
However, the maximum market shares in the Temporary Act are not 
the only relevant provisions. As mentioned above, the Temporary Act is 
implemented concurrently with the Competition Act. When the NMa decides 
– after a notification – that the concentration is not against the Temporary 
Act, it simultaneously decides whether or not a licensing procedure must 
follow.50 The concentration can still be prohibited. There can be specific 
reasons why competition in the user market is threatened, although there is 
no transgression of the maximum market shares. Furthermore, the NMa 
must look at other markets than the user markets alone. Also relevant are the 
markets for advertising and the production of television programmes, which 
are not mentioned in the Temporary Act. 
Not every media concentration needs to be notified. It is possible that 
the joint annual turnover of the undertakings involved is less than € 
113,450,000 or that less than two of the participants have an annual turnover 
in the Netherlands of more than € 30 million. Then, the concentration is not 
 
47 Art. 3, subsection 1, of the Temporary Act. 
48 Explanatory Memorandum to the Temporary Act on Media Concentrations, 
Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30921, No. 3, p. 4. 
49 See 4.1 above. 
50 Art. 3, subsection 2, of the Temporary Act. 
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large enough according to Article 29 of the Competition Act. However, the 
Temporary Act remains relevant. For example, a big newspaper concern, that 
has grown autonomously to 35% of the user market, wants to buy a small 
local paper in order to extend its market share even further. The turnover of 
the local paper might be under € 30 million, so that a notification is not 
necessary. On the other hand, the concentration violates Article 2 of the 
Temporary Act, because the joint market share is over 35%. In this case the 
NMa can only intervene afterwards by imposing a fine or giving a coercive 
order. Before doing so, the NMa will consult the Commissariaat voor de Media, 
just like in prior control cases. According to the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the Temporary Act, competitors could also start a civil lawsuit against the 
offenders. Their claim would be that the illegal acquisition is damaging to 
their financial interests.51  
5.2. Working with the European Commission 
Media concentrations with a Community dimension – very large, 
multinational concentrations – must be notified to the European Commission 
by virtue of the EU Merger Regulation of 2004.52 The Commission examines 
whether the concentration would significantly impede effective competition 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it (Article 2 Merger 
Regulation). Article 21 of the Regulation makes clear that the Commission 
has sole jurisdiction. No Member State shall apply its national legislation on 
competition to any concentration that has a Community dimension. 
However, Article 21, paragraph 4, of the Regulation adds:  
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, Member States may take appropriate 
measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into 
consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the general principles 
and other provisions of Community law. 
Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be regarded as 
legitimate interests within the meaning of the first subparagraph. 
(...) 
The Temporary Act on Media Concentrations qualifies as an ‘appropriate 
measure to protect plurality of the media’. After consulting the media 
watchdog Commissariaat voor de Media, the NMa decides whether or not a 
concentration violates the Temporary Act. In order to prevent a situation in 
which the European Commission says yes and the NMa must say no, both 
authorities closely work together. One option is that the European 
Commission decides to refer a European notification in its entirety to the 
 
51 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30921, No. 3, p. 5. 
52 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, OJ 2004, L 24, p. 1-22. See 
4.1 above. 
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NMa. Such a referral is allowed by Article 9 of the Merger Regulation under 
certain conditions. 
5.3. Other Rules Promoting Plurality 
In many European countries, State aid for public broadcasting is a matter of 
heated discussions. On the one hand, public funding is good for plurality. It 
enables public broadcasters to transmit programmes that would have no 
chance in a commercial environment, because of their high costs or because 
they attract a small audience only. On the other, State aid can harm plurality 
as well. Newspapers and private broadcasters in the Netherlands have been 
complaining since ages that they suffer from unfair competition. The 
stumbling-stone is the combination of government subsidies and the right of 
public broadcasters to sell advertising time. The subsidies are allegedly too 
generous, because they are not limited to costly high-brow programmes or 
programmes for minorities, but are spent for football and amusement as well. 
In 2006, the European Commission decided that the Netherlands had 
violated EU law, because the financing failed to comply with the principle of 
proportionality.53 The government and the public broadcasters have 
appealed to the Court of First Instance. These cases are still pending.54  
Meanwhile, the Commission has updated its State aid policy regarding 
public broadcasting.55 One of the issues the Commission has dealt with is the 
question whether public broadcasters may use public subsidies for 
interactive media services, such as video on demand. In the Netherlands, 
political parties disagree on this subject. An expert committee, advising the 
government on the future of the press, submitted in 2009 that newspapers 
must find new ways to earn money with internet services.56 The problem is 
that public broadcasters make websites too. Consumers will not pay for news 
if they can get the same information elsewhere for free. A solution might be 
to allow newspapers to re-use video items that public broadcasters have 
published on the internet. This requires an amendment of the Media Act. Up 
to now, public broadcasters are forbidden to make joint ventures with 
commercial undertakings. However, one could argue that newspapers fulfil a 
public function, just like public broadcasters do. From this point of view, 
allowing joint ventures between public broadcasters and newspapers seems 
acceptable.  
In November 2009, it became clear that private broadcasters do not like 
this idea at all. In their view, a new distortion of competition threatens. 
Private broadcasters also provide news and current events. So, why should 
only newspapers be given the privilege of getting video material from the 
 
53 Commission Decision 22 June 2006, OJ 2008, L 49, p. 1. 
54 Cases T-231/06 and T-237/06, Kingdom of the Netherlands and NOS v. Commission. 
55 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public 
service broadcasting, published 27 October 2009, OJ 2009, C 257, p. 1-14. 
56 Tijdelijke Commissie Innovatie en Toekomst Pers 2009. 
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public broadcasters? Their lobby has succeeded in gaining support in 
parliament. A motion was introduced by the liberal party stating that is 
‘undesirable that cooperation between public broadcasters and the printed 
press causes an unlevel playing field for private broadcasters’. The motion 
contains an urgent request to the government to consult all relevant parties – 
including private broadcasters – and keep parliament informed.57 Although 
the minister of Cultural Affairs advised against the motion, it was adopted 
on 8 December 2009.58 In theory, the government could ignore the request, 
but that would harm its relations with parliament. Therefore, one expects the 
government to start consultations in 2010, which can take a while. 
6. Practical Experiences 
6.1. The Case RTL /Veronica /Endemol 
RTL, Veronica and Endemol intended to create a joint company ‘Holland 
Media Groep’ in 1995. RTL was a Luxembourg-based private broadcaster. 
Veronica was a broadcaster in the Netherlands with a colourful history. First 
it had been a pirate radio station, transmitting from a ship in the North Sea. 
In 1976 – when the government policy against pirate stations tightened − 
Veronica had entered the public broadcasting system, but it never concealed 
its commercial ambitions. Endemol was a production company, specialized 
in glamorous television shows. The plan was that ‘Holland Media Groep’ 
would transmit radio and television programmes from Luxembourg to the 
Netherlands in particular. In 4.1, we have seen that the concentration was 
examined by the European Commission after a request by the Dutch 
government under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation.59 The case reveals 
that there can be a tension between competition law and freedom of speech. 
After deciding in 1995 that the concentration could not be approved 
immediately, the Commission imposed a number of remedies in 1996. One of 
these included that one of three intended television stations − RTL5 − must 
be dedicated to ‘news’.  
Arguably, it is a restriction of freedom of speech to tell a person what 
kind of programmes he must or may not transmit. In this case, the restriction 
was not too serious. The commitment to make RTL5 a news-station was 
voluntarily agreed to by the parties concerned. However, the maxim volenti 
non fit iniuria should not be used too easily. If an adult person voluntarily 
participates in a boxing game and subsequently gets a punch on his nose, of 
course he cannot complain about maltreatment. That is all in the game. But 
 
57 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32123-VIII, No. 76. 
58 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32123-VIII, No. 93, p. 51. Handelingen II 8 December 2009, p. 
3263. 
59 Commission Decision 96/346/EC of 20 September 1995, OJ 1996, L 134, p. 32-52, 
followed by Commission Decision 96/649/EC of 17 July 1996, OJ 1996, L 294, p. 14-
17. 
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how about a prisoner agreeing to medical experiments on his body in 
exchange for a sentence reduction? In the Netherlands, that would be totally 
unacceptable. Such a prisoner is no real ‘volunteer’, because if he refuses he 
will have to stay in prison. This is not to say that media companies are 
comparable to prisoners and competition authorities to evil doctors, but 
freedom of choice depends on the context. Therefore, it is important to look 
at the precise content of the commitments. Prescribing a format of news and 
current events is acceptable, prescribing support for a political opinion is not.  
6.2. The Wegener Case 
In 1999, Wegener notified an intended take-over of VNU Dagbladen to the 
Nederlandse mededingingautoriteit (NMa). Wegener was the owner of 16 
regional newspapers and 130 local magazines in the Netherlands. VNU 
Dagbladen owned 5 regional newspapers and 70 local magazines. The 
Temporary Act on Media Concentrations did not yet exist, so the only 
relevant legal background was the Competition Act of 1997. One element 
that worried the NMa, was that in the region Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 
competition would vanish. Before the take-over, there were two newspapers 
that covered Zeeuws-Vlaanderen: the Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant of 
Wegener and BN/De Stem of VNU Dagbladen. The NMa decided to allow 
the concentration on condition that both newspapers should remain separate 
and that they should keep covering the region of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. 
Wegener appealed against this condition, first to the Court of 
Rotterdam and subsequently to the College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven (Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal). The key issue was 
whether the NMa had violated freedom of speech by interfering with 
editorial choices. In 2001, the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 
decided that there had indeed been a violation of Article 7 of the Constitution 
(freedom of speech).60 However, the tribunal added that it would not have 
been against the Constitution to oblige Wegener to distribute both 
newspapers in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Determining where a newspaper has to 
be distributed is different from determining its content, so the tribunal 
considered. This reasoning shows little understanding for economic reality. It 
is easy to say that an obligation to distribute a newspaper somewhere does 
not touch upon its content. Economic reality, however, dictates that a 
regional newspaper cannot effectively be sold in a region that gets no 
editorial attention. Therefore, the obligation to distribute a newspaper in a 
particular region is practically the same as an obligation to cover this region 
from a journalistic perspective. On the other hand, it is clear that the core 
values of freedom of speech were not at stake in this case. 
 
60 See footnote 10 above. 
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6.3. The Trauma of Apex 
In the Netherlands, there are 5 paid national newspapers: De Telegraaf, 
Volkskrant, NRC-Handelsblad, AD and Trouw. In addition, there are 3 free 
national papers, 5 special interest papers (including two for orthodox 
Christians) and more than 20 regional papers. In 2004, four of the five paid 
national newspapers were in one hand: PCM (Perscombinatie Meulenhoff) 
that also owned several regional papers and a book publishing-house. Only 
De Telegraaf had its own company. The shares of PCM were owned by non-
profit organizations, whereas shares of De Telegraaf could be bought on the 
stock market, as they still can today. In the years before 2004, PCM found it 
increasingly difficult to lend money for necessary investments. That is why 
the non-profit owners of PCM decided to sell a majority of their shares to a 
British private equity fund, called ‘Apex’. This proved to be a mistake. The 
costs of the take-over by Apex were transferred to PCM itself and three years 
later the financial situation was worse than before the operation took place. 
In 2007, one of the original share-holders bought back the shares of the 
impoverished PCM.  
In 2008, the prospects of PCM deteriorated further, due to falling 
advertising income and the global credit crisis. The only solution was to sell 
51% of the shares to a Belgian newspaper company, De Persgroep. The NMa 
agreed on condition that NRC-Handelsblad must be sold to a third party. 
This happened in December 2009. The new owners of NRC-Handelsblad are 
Dutch: a family investment fund (Egeria) and a small private broadcaster 
(Het Gesprek).61 The Apex-period is considered as a traumatic experience. 
The general feeling is, that it is all right to sell newspapers to a foreign 
company, such as the Belgian Persgroep, but preferably not to private equity 
funds, aiming at short term profits, such as Apex. 
7. Prospects and Improvements 
‘Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future’, Niels Bohr once 
said. However, a few observations can be made about the prospects for the 
Temporary Act on Media Concentrations.  
First, the enthusiasm for specific anti-concentration measures in the 
media sector has diminished. The parliamentary debate on 30 November 
2009, mentioned in the introduction, shows this. A maximum market share 
for newspapers of 35% in the user market was felt to be too restrictive. It is 
better to allow one media company to have a larger share, than forcing a sale 
of newspapers to a short-term investor. The memory of Apex still hurts. 
Furthermore, the 90% rule for the combined markets of radio, television and 
newspapers, seems to be superfluous. All multi-media concentrations since 
2007 remained far away from this maximum. In all likelihood, the Temporary 
 
61 <www.stdem.org/geschiedenis>. 
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Act on Media Concentrations will end on 1 January 2012. General 
competition law will suffice. Plurality of opinion can better be promoted in 
other ways. Requirements of internal plurality and financial support for 
public services seem more suitable. Only one element of the Temporary Act 
has proved to be valuable: the yearly Media Monitor of the Commissariaat 
voor de Media. This is a useful source of information for the general 
competition authority NMa. 
Second, technology is changing rapidly. The phenomenon of papers 
printed with ink will lose ground. Today, publishers already offer the option 
that consumers do not receive tangible papers, but only a digital edition. The 
rise of mobile internet (through ‘netbooks’, ‘I-pads’ etc.) will accelerate this 
development. This makes it harder to define the relevant market. Maybe the 
criterion of circulation must be replaced by ‘viewing time’, which is the 
relevant criterion for television. However, the Commissariaat voor de Media 
already finds it difficult to determine which television programmes must be 
taken into account. Language is a starting point, but some television 
programmes in Dutch are specifically meant for Belgium and some 
programmes in another language are nevertheless meant for people in the 
Netherlands (Turkish, Arab or Frisian). The problems will increase when the 
borderlines between traditional television and video on demand fade away. 
If there is no real difference anymore, it is hard to justify why the Temporary 
Act should only regulate the user market for traditional television.  
A final question is which role the European Union should play. Should 
there be European anti-concentration regulation instead of national rules? In 
a Resolution of 25 September 2008, the European Parliament was cautiously 
sympathetic towards this idea. The Resolution calls on the Commission ‘to 
ascertain by means of consultative procedures whether minimal guidelines 
or sector-specific regulation are needed to safeguard media pluralism’.62 
However, Member States are inclined to stress that the protection of media 
pluralism is primarily a task for themselves. The Netherlands are no 
different. In particular, when the organization of public broadcasting is 
concerned, the Dutch are strongly attached to their own solutions.  
 
 
62 European Parliament resolution of 25 September 2008 on concentration and pluralism 





Baschwitz, K., De krant door alle tijden, 2nd ed., Amsterdam: Keesing, 1949. 
Nieuwenhuis 1991 
Nieuwenhuis, A.J., Persvrijheid en persbeleid, Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel 
Uitgever, 1991. 
Schneider & Hemels 1979 
Schneider, M. & Hemels, J., De Nederlandse krant 1618-1978, 4th ed., Baarn: Het 
Wereldvenster, 1979. 
Tijdelijke Commissie Innovatie en Toekomst Pers 2009 
Tijdelijke Commissie Innovatie en Toekomst Pers (Commissie Brinkman), De 
volgende editie, Den Haag, 23 June 2009. 
